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In this paper I derive a complete characterization for the equilibria
that may arise in a binary choice interaction model with a ﬁnite number
of interacting agents. In particular, the correspondence between the
interaction strength, the number of agents and the set of equilibria is
derived.
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11 Introduction
Over the last decade, the study of the role of social interactions in economic
behavior has become an important area of research. One reason for this is
the power of these models to explain large variations in aggregate behavior
over time and space. Diﬀerences in crime rates over states (Glaeser, Sac-
erdote and Scheinkman, 1996), large variation in educational attainment
across school classes (Hoxby, 2000), fashion cycles (Pesendorfer, 1995), ﬂuc-
tuations in stock prices (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998) and
herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992) are all examples of phenomena that cannot
be fully accounted for by economic or cultural diﬀerences, but for which
interactions-based models oﬀer an explanation. Almost all of these models
use the notion of strategic complementarity, implying that an increase in the
action of all agents except agent i increases the marginal return to agent i’s
action. A main reason for the popularity of these models is that they are
capable of generating the social multiplier or multiple equilibria that creates
large variations in aggregate behavior.
In models with strategic substitutes, an increase in the action of all agents
except agent i decreases the marginal return to agent i’s action. In contrast
to models with complements, models with strategic substitutes do not gen-
erate multiplier eﬀects or multiple equilibria at the aggregate level.1 One can
think of many instances in which people derive utility from being diﬀerent
than others. To give an example, most school classes inhabit some pupils
that purposely try to distinguish themselves from the others. Depending on
context, games with best-response functions that are decreasing in the ac-
1As far as I am aware, Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003) present the only example in
which strategic substitutes create multiple equilibria. However, instead of showing how
multiple equilibria can be generated within one group, they introduce a second group which
negatively interacts with the ﬁrst group such that in equilibrium, aggregate behavior may
diﬀer between the two groups. That is, agents in diﬀerent groups can make diﬀerent
choices in equilibrium, but the choices of agents in the same group have to be the same.
Aggregated at the society-level however, all equilibria exhibit the same behavior.
2tions of other players are also refered to as games with negative externalities
or games with negative interactions.
In a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities, Cooper
and John (1988) prove that in games with homogenous agents, strategic
complementarity is a necessary condition for the existence of multiple (sym-
metric) Nash equilibria at the aggregate level. Brock and Durlauf (2001a,
2001b, 2003) derive conditions under which strategic complementarity be-
tween the choices of individual agents leads to multiple equilibria at the
aggregate level in the class of discrete choice interactions models. The lit-
erature on the eﬀects of strategic complements further includes studies on
conformity (Bernheim, 1994), peer eﬀects (Kremer and Levy, 2001) or the
upholding of social norms (Becker and Murphy, 2001).
In this study, instead of considering the consequences of social inter-
actions for aggregate behavior, I will focus on the consequences of social
interactions at the level of the individual. The main contribution of the
paper is a number of propositions on equilibrium behavior in a binary si-
multaneous discrete response model with a limited number of agents. In
this model, an individual agent’s behavior is dependent on the observed
behavior of other agents. This model is closely related to the model esti-
mated in Kooreman and Soetevent (2002). In that paper we use the model
to empirically analyze interaction eﬀects among teenagers in school classes.
Questions that are answered in the present paper concern equilibrium ex-
istence and multiplicity of equilibria. Not only do I look at the case with
strategic complements, but I purposely extend the discussion to encompass
also the case with strategic substitutes. It turns out that the latter case has
some remarkable implications.
For both cases, equilibrium existence is proved. In empirical work on
binary choice interaction models, it is particularly important to account for
the possibility of multiple equilibria. Assumptions concerning equilibrium
3selection are more pivotal when multiple equilibria occur more frequently.
For this reason, the derivation of tight upper bounds on the number of
equilibria given a certain level of complementarity (substitutability) and a
number of agents N is useful. I ﬁnd that the upper bound for the number
of equilibria grows linearly in N for the case with strategic complements,
but exponentially for the case with strategic substitutes. Besides the for-
mulation of upper bounds, analytical expressions on the expected number
of equilibria are obtained. Surprisingly, for the model with strategic sub-
stitutes (complements), the expected number of equilibria is non-increasing
(non-decreasing) when N ≤ 3, but much more whimsical when N>3. An-
other result is that in the case of strategic substitutes, two outcomes can
only belong both to the set of equilbria if in both outcomes the aggregate
number of agents choosing a particular action is the same. Finally, I de-
rive some results concerning the diﬀerences in model behavior for an even
and an odd number of agents. For an even number of agents, the upper
bound on the number of equilibria is always reached for a high enough level
of substitutability; for an odd number, this is crucially dependent on the
distribution of private utilities of the agents.
In the analysis, I will assume that the number of agents that comprises
the reference group is limited. In its focus on small groups, the paper is
complementary to much of the existing literature. As Moﬃtt (2001) notes:
“The crude proxies for neighborhood eﬀects that are used in the empirical
literature, which are solely the result of data limitations, should not lead to a
conclusion that no social interactions are present in smaller geographic areas.
More generally, the theory is consistent with a small intervention aﬀecting
only a small number of individuals.” Other studies that pay attention to
small groups are Krauth (2001), who adapts the Brock-Durlauf model to
a small group environment and Ioannides (2003) who derives a number of
general results for bounded social structures using graph theory.
4In a related branch of literature, Tamer (2003) does explicitly allow for
negative externalities in a 2 × 2 binary choice game. His objective is not to
derive equilibrium properties as well as to ﬁnd an unbiased estimation proce-
dure in the presence of multiple equilibria. In another paper, Tamer (2002)
extends this procedure to situations with more than two agents. In an em-
pirical application he estimates interactions in the decisions of airline com-
panies whether or not to enter a given market. A noteworthy diﬀerence with
Tamer’s approach and earlier work on simultaneous discrete choice models
is that I categorize binary choices as {−1,1}, instead of {0,1}.W h e r e a si n
standard binary choice models the categorization is immaterial, it is not in
the present context. I will argue that a {0,1}-support is a natural choice in
simultaneous discrete response models that study ﬁrm’s entry decisions to
a certain market – the focus of Tamer’s application – but that the {−1,1}-
support may be more appropriate when one studies social interactions in
small groups.
Understanding the eﬀects of negative externalities on equilibrium be-
havior is a prerequisite for the incorporation of more general interaction
patterns into economic models. Until now, interactions-based models have
focused on either positive or negative interactions within a social group. In
reality however, it is likely that within a group, some agents are aﬀected by
conformity and others by the desire to distinguish themselves. This leads to
a process in which agent A wants to resemble person B, but person B wants
to behave diﬀerent than person A. In this case, there does not exist a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Analysis of these kind of models is left for
future research.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is presented in the next
section. Diﬀerences in behavior when using choices with support {0,1}
instead of {−1,1} are indicated. Results on the equilibrium properties of
the model are derived in section 3. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses a slightly more
5general model with gender-based interaction terms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a population of N individuals indexed by i, i =1 ,2,...,N.E a c h
player i faces a binary choice and these choices are denoted by an in-
dicator variable yi which has support Yi = {−1,1}. Yi is the strategy
set of player i and Y = ×N
i=1Yi.E l e m e n t s o f Y are called strategy pro-
ﬁles. A full strategy proﬁle is denoted by y =( yi,y−i), where y−i =
(y1,y 2,...,y i−1,y i+1,...,y N) . Note that the number of elements in Y is
2N. Each individual makes a choice in order to maximize a payoﬀ function
V : Y → R ∪{ − ∞ } .
In the standard economic approach, the payoﬀ function is dependent
on individual characteristics. Following the notation in Brock and Durlauf
(2001b), I assume that these characteristics can be divided into an observ-
able vector xi and a random shock  i(yi) that is unobservable to the modeller
but observable to agent i. Moreover, in interactions-based models explicit
attention is given to the inﬂuence of the behavior of others on each individ-
ual’s choice. Each choice is then described as
max
yi∈Yi
V (yi,xi,y−i,  i(yi)). (1)
Similar to Brock and Durlauf (2001b), I assume that the payoﬀ function V
can be additively decomposed into three terms:
V (yi,xi,y−i,  i(yi)) = u(yi, xi)+S(yi,xi,y−i)+ i(yi), (2)
where the ﬁrst term u(yi, xi) denotes deterministic private utility, S(yi,xi,y−i)
denotes deterministic social utility and  i(yi) denotes random private utility.








6Deﬁne y−ij = y\{yi,y j} so that (yi,xi,y j,y−ij). Note that
{V (1,xi,1,y−ij,  i(yi)) − V (−1,xi,1,y−ij,  i(yi))}−
{V (1,xi,−1,y−ij,  i(yi)) − V (−1,xi,−1,y−ij,  i(yi))}





Thus, for γ>0 the utility of choosing yi =1( v e r s u syi = −1) when another
individual j chooses yj = 1 as well is larger than the utility of choosing yi =1
(versus yi = −1) when another individual chooses yj = −1. In this case the
parameter γ measures the strategic complementarity when γ>0 between
the choice of any pair of individuals, or the extent to which the choices are
strategic substitutes when γ<0.2 In fact, for γ>0( γ<0), the model
falls into the class of supermodular (submodular) games. Supermodular
(submodular) games are games in which each player’s strategy set is partially
ordered and the marginal returns to increasing one’s strategy rise (decrease)
with increases in the competitors’ strategies.3
Conditional on the choice by individual i, deterministic private utility is
assumed to be a linear function of exogenous characteristics xi, such that:
u(1, xi)=β 
1xi; u(−1, xi)=β 
−1xi.
The best response function of individual i given the choices of the other









j =iyj +  i
yi =1 i fy∗
i > 0
yi = −1i f y∗
i ≤ 0
(3)
2When γ = 0, the model reduces to the standard binary choice formulation without
externalities.
3Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 1255). See also Vives (1990) and the recent textbook
treatments of Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999). Topkis (p. 11) deﬁnes a partially ordered
set as a set X on which there is a binary relation   that is reﬂexive, antisymmetric, and
transitive.
7where y∗
i denotes the diﬀerence between the utility individual i derives from
choosing yi = 1 and the utility he derives from choosing yi = −1, conditional
on y−i,t h a ti s ,
y∗
i = V (1,xi,y−i,  i(1)) − V (−1,xi,y−i,  i(−1)),
with β ≡ β1 − β−1; i ≡  i(1) −  i(−1).
Deﬁne x ≡ (x 
1,x 
2,...,x 
N)  and   ≡ ( 1,  2,...,  N) . A strategy proﬁle
y is a pure Nash equilibrium proﬁle if and only if it is consistent with (3) for
all i, i.e. if after substitution of these values of yi in Si we have y∗
i > 0 for all
i with yi =1 ,a n dy∗
i ≤ 0 for all i with yi = −1. Let Q(β,γ,x, ,N)d e n o t e
the number of pure Nash equilibria given {β,γ,x, } and the population size
N.T h a ti s ,f o rN ≥ 2,





































with I(·) an indicator function.4 For each element yit of a strategy proﬁle,
the indicator functions evaluate the relevant condition on  i: − i <β  xi +
(γ
 
j =i yjt)/(N − 1) if yit =1 ,a n d i ≤− β xi − (γ
 
j =iyjt)/(N − 1) if
yit = −1. When the relevant condition is satisﬁed for all elements of a
certain strategy proﬁle yt, the product in (4) is one. In all other cases,
the product is zero. Finally summing over all 2N strategy proﬁles gives the
number of pure Nash equilibria. In the model without social interactions
(i.e. γ = 0) each combination of {β,γ =0 ,x, } obviously deﬁnes a unique
equilibrium, and thus Q(β,0,x, ,N)=1 .
An important feature of the model with social interactions is that, for
a given combination of {β,γ  =0 ,x, }, several strategy proﬁles may be
consistent with (3). If γ =1a n dβ x1 +  1 = β x2 +  2 = −1
2, for example,
4I follow the convention 0
0 ≡ 1.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibria in  -space (N =2 ,γ>0,β x1 = β x2 =0 )f o r
support Yi (left panel) and support ˜ Yi (right panel).
proﬁles y =( 1 ,1)  and y =( −1,−1)  are both consistent with (3). In the
left panel of ﬁgure 1, equilibrium proﬁles for the two-person game are drawn
in  -space. The shaded area is the area with multiple equilibria.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between
diﬀerent values of γ and N on the number and nature of equilibria. I will
derive a number of results regarding the existence and maximum number of
equilibria that can occur, for both the case with a positive as with a negative
value of γ.
2.1 Choice of support {−1,1} versus {0,1}
It is of some importance to discuss the choice of support Yi = {−1,1}
instead of the alternative ˜ Yi = {0,1}. The latter is the common choice
in standard binary choice models where the diﬀerence is just a matter of
scaling and therefore immaterial. In this section, I will show that the speciﬁc
choice of support does aﬀect the equilibrium properties of binary choice
9interaction models. This fact has hitherto not been explicitly recognized
in the literature. Krauth (2001) for example, taciturnly switches to ˜ Yi as
support in his development of the small sample analog of the Brock-Durlauf
model, whereas these authors themselves employ Yi. Key idea is that in using
support Yi, the model is symmetric and therefore invariant with respect to
interchanging the two choices. This is not the case with ˜ Yi.
This diﬀerence between the two models becomes clear when one com-
pares the equilibria for the two-person game in  -space under the assumption
that exogenous variables are irrelevant (β x1 = β x2 = 0). The left panel of
ﬁgure 1 uses support Yi and is symmetric with respect to the line  1+ 2 =0 .
The right panel, which uses support ˜ Yi,i sn o t .
Compared to the left panel of ﬁgure 1, one observes that in the right
panel the shaded area with multiple equilibria is reduced and restricted to
the points where the private utility diﬀerence of smoking for both players
is negative (β xi +  i =  i < 0,i =1 ,2). When using ˜ Yi, one implicitly
assumes that only positive choices have a social eﬀect. One justiﬁcation
for this is from an evolutionary point of view, for example by arguing that
everybody starts as a non-smoker, such that only the teenagers that start
smoking give a signal and the number of non-smokers is irrelevant. Note,
however, that the decision not to smoke can convey just as strong a signal
to others, especially in environments with many smokers.5
In other contexts however, ˜ Yi may be the preferred support. Consider
for example the context in which ﬁrms have to make a decision to enter
a certain market (Tamer, 2002). It is plausible that this decision is only
5To give an example, suppose that in a class with 9 teenagers, 3 of them would smoke
were social interactions absent (γ = 0), that is, y
∗
i = β
 xi +  i > 0f o rt h r e eo ft h e m
and y
∗
i ≤ 0 for the others. How would one interpret in this instance the observation
of zero smokers in this class? A natural explanation is that due to a social eﬀect, the
six non-smokers keep the potential smokers from smoking. Support Yi allows for this





j =i yj = γ
−8





j =i yj = 0 irrespective of γ, such that social interactions cannot oﬀer an
explanation.
10dependent on how many other ﬁrms decide to enter the market and that
the number of ﬁrms that decide not to enter is irrelevant. All results in the
sequel are derived while working with support Yi.
3 Equilibrium properties
3.1 Existence
Deﬁne zi ≡ β xi + i and k ≡
 N
i=1 yi,t h a ti s ,k is the net number of agents
choosing y =1 . 6 Rank observations on basis of the values of zi.D e n o t et h e
ordered values as z[1] ≥ z[2] ≥ ...≥ z[N]. Denote the corresponding values
of y for the agent with z[j] as y[j]. Note that the latter are not ordered,
such that it is not precluded that e.g. y[j] <y [j+1]. The following propo-
sition guarantees equilibrium existence for model (3) in case of strategic
complements as well as strategic substitutes.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium existence
For every combination {β,γ,x, } there exists at least one vector y ≡ (y1,y 2,
...,y N)  for which (3) holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In the proof, explicit equilibria are derived for every combination {β,γ,x, },
although for the case with strategic complements, an alternative proof can
be given, based on the supermodular character of the game. It is worth
mentioning that for the equilibria given in the proof, |k| = |
 N
i=1 yi| de-
creases monotonically to 0 (1) as γ →− ∞for N even (N odd). In the next
subsection, it will become clear that this result holds more generally: in equi-
librium, the diﬀerence between the number of agents choosing y =1a n d
6Note that given N, only those values of k for which N + k is an even number are
possible. This follows from the observation that k = a · 1− (N − a),a∈{ 0,1,...,N} can
be rewritten as N + k =2 a.
11the number of agents choosing y = −1, is smaller when γ is more negative,
other things equal.
3.2 Multiple equilibria
In section 2, we observed that multiple equilibria may occur for certain
combinations of variables and parameter values. In this section, I will derive
strict upper bounds for Q(β,γ,x, ,N). It turns out that the situation with
strategic substitutes (γ<0) is characterized by fundamentally diﬀerent
equilibrium behavior than the one with strategic complements (γ>0).
Moreover, it makes a diﬀerence whether the population has an even or an
odd number of members. In section 3.3, two examples are provided which
illustrate the results for the case with strategic substitutes.
The proof of proposition 2 for strategic complements uses the following
lemma that was ﬁrst formulated in Kooreman and Soetevent (2003).









where zi ≡ β xi +  i.
The lemma’s eﬀect is that it restricts the maximum number of potential
equilibria to N +1. The following observation is an immediate consequence
of lemma 1:
1 In any equilibrium the agents with yi =1are those with the largest
values for zi.
Now consider two vectors y and ˜ y that diﬀer in one element only. With-
out loss of generality, assume that yi =1a n d˜ yi = −1f o rs o m ei. Deﬁne
y−i ≡ (y1,y 2,...,y i−1,y i+1,...,y N)  and ˜ y−i ≡ (˜ y1, ˜ y2,...,˜ yi−1, ˜ yi+1,...,˜ yN) .









j =i ˜ yj =
12˜ y∗
i given a combination of {β,γ,x, }. This implies that yi =˜ yi and we ar-
rive at a contradiction. Note that this result holds irrespective of γ being
positive or negative. The following observation is thus obtained:
2 Two vectors y and ˜ y that diﬀer in only one element cannot belong both
to the set of equilibria.
The following proposition states that for a situation with strategic com-
plements, the maximal number of equilibria grows linearly in N. The second
part ensures that the upper bound on the number of equilibria is strict.
Proposition 2 Maximum number of equilibria (strategic comple-
ments)
For every combination {β,γ > 0,x, }, the discrete interaction model (3)




+1  . (5)
Moreover, for every number N, there exists a combination of {β,γ > 0,x, }
for which Q(β,γ,x, ,N)=d(N).
Proof Proposition 2: From observations 1 and 2 it directly follows that the
number of equilibria for a given combination of {β,γ > 0,x, } can be at
most d =  N
2 +1  ,w h e r e w  denotes the largest integer not larger than
w. To give an example, assume that the number of agents N =8 . D u et o
observations 1 and 2, the strategy proﬁles of the diﬀerent equilibria must be
strictly ordered and diﬀer in at least two elements. This leaves the following
ﬁve strategy proﬁles as the only candidates:
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) ;( 1 ,1,1,1,1,1,−1,−1) ;( 1 ,1,1,1,−1,−1,−1,−1) ;
(1,1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1) ;( −1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1) .
According to the proposition, the maximum number of equilibria can indeed
be at most 5, since  N
2 +1   =5w h e nN =8 .
13The proof of the second part – the upper bound on the number of equi-
libria is strict – runs as follows. Denote the d equilibria that are to be
sustained as7
y1 =( 1 ,1,...,1) 
y2 =
 
(1,...,1,−1,−1)  if N is even,




(1,...,1N−2(j−1),−1N−2(j−1)+1,...,−1)  if N is even,
(1,...,1N−2(j−1)−1,−1N−2(j−1),...,−1)  if N is odd,
with j =3 ,...,d− 1.
yd =( −1,−1,...,−1) .
First note that y1 can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if and
only if z[N] > −γ and that yd can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome
if and only if z[1] ≤ γ. Further note that yd−i, i =1 ,...,d− 2c a nb e
sustained as equilibria if and only if z[2i] >γN−4i+1
N−1 and z[2i+1] ≤ γ N−4i−1
N−1 .
The fact that these necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the values of z
can be satisﬁed simultaneously completes the proof. 
In the proof of the corresponding proposition for the case with strategic
substitutes, I will make use of the following two lemma’s:
Lemma 2 If for a given combination {β,γ < 0,x, }, y and ˜ y are both





The proof of lemma 2 uses the following result:
Lemma 3 If for a given combination {β,γ < 0,x, } there exists an equi-
librium y with y[j] = −1 and y[j+1] =1 , then there also exists an equilibrium
˜ y with ˜ y[j] =1and ˜ y[j+1] = −1 and ˜ y[i] = y[i] for i  = j,j +1 .
7When N is odd, there has to be one equilibrium that diﬀers in at least three elements
when compared to any of the other equilibria. Without loss of generality I assume the
last three elements of y to be the three elements that move together.
14Proofs Lemma 2 and 3: See the Appendix.
The message of lemma 2 is that for a given value of γ<0, two diﬀerent




i=1 ˜ yi.T h a t i s , b o t h
equilibria must have the same number of subjects with outcome +1 and
with outcome −1.
Repeated application of lemma 3 shows that a strategy proﬁle y with
 N
i=1 yi = k can only be an equilibrium if the ordered (with respect to the
zi’s) strategy proﬁle y =( 1 1,12,...,1k,−1k+1,...,−1N)  is an equilibrium.
This result will prove to be useful later on in deriving upper bounds for the
number of equilibria that may be sustained for a given value of γ.
Proposition 3 Maximum number of equilibria (strategic substi-
tutes)
For every combination {β,γ < 0,x, }, the discrete interaction model (3)




if N is even,and
d(N)=do(N)=
N!
{(N +1 ) /2}!{(N − 1)/2}!
if N is odd.
Moreover, for every even (odd) number N, there exists a combination of
{β,γ < 0,x, } for which Q(β,γ,x, ,N)=de(N) (Q(β,γ,x, ,N)=do(N)).
Proof Proposition 3: The ﬁrst part follows from lemma 2 by noting that the
maximum number of possible equilibria subject to the condition
 N
i=1 yi = k
is obtained when k is chosen to equal 0 (+1 or −1) when N is even (odd).
In that case, there are N/2( N/2+1o rN/2 − 1) agents choosing +1 and
the others choosing −1, giving the upper bounds on the number of possible
equilibria as given by d(N) in proposition 3.
What is left to show is that there exists a combination of {β,γ < 0,x, }
for which the maximum number of equilibria is obtained. From lemma 2
15we know that, given a combination of {β,γ < 0,x, }, every element in the
equilibrium set must have the same number of agents choosing y =1 . F o r
N is even, the set can thus only have de(N) elements when the set contains
all strategy proﬁles for which the number of agents choosing y =1e q u a l s
the number of agents choosing y = −1. For each of these proﬁles to be an
equilibrium, it must be optimal for each agent i to choose yi =1g i v e nt h a t
 
j =iyj = −1a n dt oc h o o s eyi = −1g i v e nt h a t
 
j =i yj =1 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,









For γ negative enough, this condition is satisﬁed irrespective of the values
of z[1],...z [N].
For N is odd, the equilibrium set can only contain do(N)e l e m e n t sw h e n
the set contains all strategy proﬁles for which
 N
i=1 yi = 1 or all strategy
proﬁles for which
 N
i=1 yi = −1. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
each of the proﬁles with
 N




≤ 0a n d z[N] > 0, (6)
and the corresponding conditions for the strategy proﬁles with
 N
i=1 yi = −1
are









i=1 yi = −1) is only obtainable when all z
values are positive (non-positive). Together this proves proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 states that for the case with strategic substitutes — as in
the case with strategic complements — the upper bound on the number of
equilibria is strict. However, a notable diﬀerence with proposition 2 is that
16the maximal number of equilibria does not grow linearly but exponentially
in N.N o t et h a t
de(N)
do(N−1) = 2 for all even N and limN→∞
do(N)
de(N−1) ↑ 2f o rN
odd. That is, (in the limit) adding one agent to the population doubles the
upper bound on the number of equilibria.
Lemma 2 and the observation that for the equilibria in the proof of
proposition 1, |k| = |
 N
i=1 yi| monotonically decreases as γ →− ∞ , together
lead to the corollary8 that for all equilibria, |k| decreases monotonically to 0
(1) as γ →− ∞ ,g i v e nN even (odd). This result is consonant with intuition:
variation in behavior increases when the utility derived from being diﬀerent
increases.









yi| 1 as γ →− ∞and N is odd.
3.3 Examples
In order to provide some further intuition for the results derived for strategic
substitutes, I will present two examples in this section.
Example 1 Consider four agents with private utilities z[1] =4 ,z [2] =
2.5,z [3] =2a n dz[4] = −3. Thus, without interactions (γ = 0), the unique
equilibrium is y =( 1 ,1,1,−1) and k =
 4
i=1 yi = 2. How does the set
of equilibria change when γ decreases? From corollary 1 we know that
|k| decreases monotonically to zero (since N is even) as γ →− ∞ .F o r
this reason, it is natural to ask ﬁrst for the conditions under which other
8The corresponding result for positive interactions is that |
 N
i=1 yi| N as γ →∞ .
That is, in the limit all agents conform to y =1o rt oy = −1 regardless of their private
utility such that variation in behavior is minimized.
17Figure 2: Development of the number of equilibria as γ decreases in a group
of four agents, with z[1] =4 ,z [2] =2 .5,z [3] =2a n dz[4] = −3.
equilibria with k = 2 are admissible. Consider the outcome in which the
y-values of agents 3 and 4 have switched, y =( 1 ,1,−1,1). For this outcome
to be an equilibrium, the utility diﬀerence of smoking has to be non-positive
for agent 3 and positive for agent 4. That is: a) z[3] + γ k+1
N−1 =2+γ ≤ 0,
and b) z[4] + γ k−1
N−1 = −3+γ/3 > 0. (See the solid lines in ﬁgure 2.) It
folllows (from the ﬁgure) that the second condition cannot be satisﬁed for
γ<0 and for this reason, no other equilibria with k = 2 are obtained when
γ decreases.
Moreover, one knows (see ﬁgure 2) that all equilibria with k = 2 become
infeasible when, given k = 2, the third agent’s utility from smoking turns
negative, that is z[3] + γ k−1
N−1 =2+γ/3 ≤ 0, which happens at −γ =6 .
Thus, for values of −γ ≥ 6, only those equilibria are admissible in which
at least two agents choose y = −1. The equilibrium is unique for values of
−γ slightly larger than 6: agent 3 and 4 choose y = −1 and the other two
y =+ 1 . A s−γ becomes larger than 7.5, a second equilibrium is possible
18Figure 3: Development of the number of equilibria as γ decreases in a group
of four agents, with z[1] =4 ,z [2] =2 .5,z [3] =2a n dz[4] =1 .
(y =( 1 ,−1,1,−1)), since now z[2]+γ k−1
N−1 =2 .5+γ/3 ≤ 0. If −γ gets lager
than 9, again an equilibrium is added (y =( 1 ,−1,−1,1)) since — given the
choice of the other agents — the utility diﬀerence to choosing y =1i sn o w
positive for agent 4. Eventually, the number of equilibria in the set doubles
when −γ ≥ 12 (and attains it’s maximum value de(N) = 6; see the dashed
lines in ﬁgure 2).
Example 2 The previous example might lead to the impression that the
set of possible equilibria increases as −γ increases. In general, this is not the
case. Consider the slightly diﬀerent example with z[1] =4 ,z [2] =2 .5,z [3] =2
and z[4] = 1. (See ﬁgure 3.) For values of −γ just below 3, the equilibrium
set consists of 3 diﬀerent equilibria, all having one agent choosing y = −1:
y =( 1 ,1,1,−1),y =( 1 ,1,−1,1) and y =( 1 ,−1,1,1). For values of −γ just
above 3, given that exactly one agent chooses y = −1, this agent must be
agent 4, since then z[4] + γ/3 < 0.
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Figure 4: The expected number of equilibria of model (3) for N ∈{ 3,4,5,6},
β xi =5a n d i ∼ N(0,1), ∀i.
3.4 Expected number of equilibria
In section 3.2, upper bounds for the number of admissible equilibria were
derived for every combination of {β,γ,x, }. In this section, I will focus on
the expected number of equilibria given a combination {β,γ,x,N}.
With independently and identically distributed disturbances  i,t h ee x -












































with F(·) the cumulative distribution function of the  i’s.
Using this expression and making some fairly general assumptions on
the distribution of the  ’s, proposition 4 can be derived. This proposition
20describes how the expected number of equilibria changes with γ for a binary
choice game with N agents.
Proposition 4 Expected number of equilibria
Assume that the  i’s in (3) are i.i.d. distributed according to a symmetric
p.d.f. f(·).
Then for N ≤ 3, ∂E[Q(β,γ,x,N)]/∂γ is non-positive for γ ∈ (−∞,0) and
non-negative for γ ∈ (0,+∞).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
∂E[Q(β,0,x,N)]
∂γ










For N>3, ∂E[Q(β,γ,x,N)]/∂γ may change sign at points other than
γ =0 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
In ﬁgure 4, the expected number of equilibria is plotted for N =3 ,4,5
and 6 for the speciﬁc case where agents are homogenous with respect to
deterministic private utility (β xi =5 , ∀i) and where the  ’s are assumed
to be i.i.d. N(0,1) distributed. One observes that E[Q(β,γ,x,3)] (the
solid line) is nonincreasing in the domain γ ∈ (−∞,0) but that in the
same domain, E[Q(β,γ,x,N)] has decreasing as well as increasing parts for
N ∈{ 4,5,6}. These oscillations are a consequence of changes in the set
of equilibria as γ changes value. Example 2 in the previous section gives a
particular example of how the number of equilibria may increase as well as
decrease as gamma becomes more negative. Note that proposition 4 imposes
no assumptions on the value of the β xi’s.
Figure 4 shows that for a broad range of γ, the expected number of
equilibria is well below the upper bound. In particular, the range for which
21this holds seems to increase with N. Notice that especially for positive
values of γ, multiple equilibria do not seem to be an important issue.9
4 Extension to more general interactions
The model considered so far only allows for identical interactions between all
individuals in the population. One can think of more general interactions,
where the degree of interaction between two given individuals depends on
e.g. their socio-economic characteristics. In this section, I will brieﬂy discuss
the consequences of one particular extension of the model given by (3), in
which the degree of interaction is made gender-dependent. This leads to
four diﬀerent interaction parameters: γGB gives the eﬀect of boys on girls;
γBG from girls on boys, and γGG and γBB the intra-gender eﬀects between





i = β xi + Si +  i
yi =1 i fy∗
i > 0,



















j )/(N − 1) if i is a boy,
with yG
j ≡ yj · I(j is a girl) and yB
j ≡ yj · I(j is a boy), ∀j,a n dI(·)a n
indicator function. See Kooreman and Soetevent (2003) for an empirical
application of this model.
Corollary 2 For every combination {β,γBB ≥ 0,γ GG ≥ 0,γ GB,γ BG,x, }
there exists at least one vector y ≡ (y1,y 2,...,y N)  for which (8) holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The equivalent of proposition 2 for the extended model follows automat-
ically:
9This is consonant with the result in section ??, where in most cases the probability
of an unique equilibrium was estimated to be larger than 80 percent.
22Corollary 3 For every combination {β,γBB > 0,γ GG > 0,γ GB,γ BG,x, },
the discrete interaction model given by (8) with NG girls and NB boys can








Moreover, for all NG and NB, there exists a combination of {β,γBB >
0,γ GG > 0,γ GB,γ BG,x, } for which the maximum number of equilibria is
obtained.
It is noteworthy that the values of the cross-gender interaction parame-
ters γGB and γBG do not play a role in determining the maximum number
of equilibria.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, a number of equilibrium properties were derived for the binary
choice interaction model with a ﬁnite number of agents. Both for the case
with strategic complements and strategic substitutes, equilibrium existence
was proved and tight upper bounds were derived for the number of equilibria,
given the number of agents and the degree of interaction between them.
For the case with strategic substitutes, I showed that two outcomes can
only be both an equilibrium outcome if for each of them the same number
of agents chooses +1. When the number of agents is larger than 3, the
expected number of equilibria is non-monotone with respect to changes in
t h ed e g r e eo fi n t e r a c t i o nγ. I also brieﬂy discussed the consequences for the
equilibrium set when the model is extended to allow for gender-dependent
interactions. The main ﬁnding here is that the introduction of cross-gender
interactions does not aﬀect the upper bounds for the number of equilibria.
One major challenge for future research is to incorporate more general
interaction structures in empirical work, by allowing interaction parameters
23to depend on socio-economic characteristics. Another is to develop an eﬃ-
cient algorithm for ﬁnding all equilibria in games with strategic substitutes.
246 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium existence
The case for γ = 0 is obvious. I prove proposition 1 for the game with strate-
gic complements (γ>0) and the game with strategic substitutes (γ<0)
separately. For the ﬁrst case, existence can be readily proved by showing
that the game described in section 2 belongs to the class of supermodular
games. Existence then immediately follows from using Theorem 5 in Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990, p. 1265). In this appendix however, I will follow
for both cases the alternative route of proving equilibrium existence through
ﬁnding an explicit equilibrium for all combinations of {β,γ,x, }.T h em a i n
reason is that this procedure gives more insight into some of the peculiarities
of the model.
Strategic complements (γ>0)
Every possible combination of {β,γ > 0,x, } clearly falls into one of the
three following categories
(i) z[1] ≤ 0;
(ii) z[N] > 0;
(iii) z[1] > 0,z [N] ≤ 0.
I show that for each z in every category there is an associated y for which
(3) holds, for all values γ>0.
(i) z[1] ≤ 0:
yi = −1,i =1 ,2,...,N (k = −N) is an equilibrium solution, since
y∗
[1] = z[1] − γ N−1
N−1 ≤ 0. This implies that y∗
[i] ≤ 0 ∀i since γ N−1
N−1 is a
constant and z[i] weakly decreases with i.
25(ii) z[N] > 0:
yi =1 ,i=1 ,2,...,N (k = N) is an equilibrium solution, since y∗
[i] =
z[i] + γ N−1
N−1 > 0,∀i.
(iii) z[1] > 0,z [N] ≤ 0:
Deﬁne M ≡ 0i fz[j] ≤− γ
(2j−N−1)





N−1 ;∀j ≤ i
 
otherwise. Five examples of se-
quences of z[i] with N =6a n dγ = 1 are plotted in ﬁgure 5 together
with the corresponding values of M. The solid line represents the
equation z[i] = −γ
(2i−N−1)
N−1 .
If M =0 ,y[i] = −1, i =1 ,2,...,N is an equilibrium solution, since
y∗
[i] = z[i] − γ ≤ z[1] − γ ≤ 0, ∀i. (See the +-sequence in ﬁgure 5.)
If M>0, y[i] =1f o ri =1 ,2...,M and y[i] = −1f o ri = M +
1,M +2 ,...,N (k = M − [N − M]=2 M − N) is an equilibrium
solution, since y∗
[i] = z[i] + γ 2M−N−1
N−1 > 0f o ri =1 ,2,...,M and
y∗
[j] ≤ y∗
[M+1] = z[M+1] + γ 2M−N+1
N−1 = z[M+1] + γ
2(M+1)−N−1
N−1 ≤ 0f o r
all j = M +1 ,M+2 ,...,N.
Note that for sequences of z[i]’s for which M = N (like the sequence
of circles and x-es in ﬁgure 5), y[i] = −1, i =1 ,2,...,N is another
equilibrium solution if and only if z[1] ≤ γ. In ﬁgure 5, this condition
holds for the sequence of x-es but not for the sequence of circles. 
Strategic substitutes (γ<0)
In this case, I distinguish between the case where the number of subjects N
is even and the case where this number is odd.




. Suppose that m>
N/2, that is, the majority of the subjects have a value of z greater than





























Figure 5: Five examples of z[i]-sequences and the corresponding solutions




N−1 ;∀j ≤ i
 















,f o rr =1 ,2,...,m− N/2 − 1.
First consider the case m>N / 2 + 1. Since the intervals are non-
overlapping and since I0∪I1∪...∪Im−N/2 =[ 0 ,∞), −γ is in one and only one
of these intervals. If −γ ∈ I0, y =( 1 ,1,...,1m,−1,...,−1) ,( k =2 m−N)
is an equilibrium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ...≥ y∗
[m] = z[m]+γ 2m−N−1
N−1 >
0a n dy∗
[N] ≤ ... ≤ y∗
[m+1] = z[m+1] + γ 2m−N+1
N−1 ≤ 0. If −γ ∈ Ir,f o r
r =1 ,2,...,m−N/2−1, y =( 1 ,1,...,1m−r,−1,...,−1)  (k =2 ( m−r)−N)
is an equilibrium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
m−r = z[m−r] +
γ
2(m−r)−N−1
N−1 > 0a n dy∗
[N] ≤ ...≤ y∗
[m−r+1] = z[m−r+1] +γ
2(m−r)−N+1
N−1 ≤ 0.
If −γ ∈ Im−N/2, y =( 1 ,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1)  (k = 0) is an equilib-
rium, since for this solution y∗
[1] ≥ ... ≥ y∗
[N/2] = z[N/2] + γ −1
N−1 > 0a n d
y∗
[N] ≤ ...≤ y∗
[N/2+1] = z[N/2+1] + γ 1
N−1 ≤ 0.
If m = N/2+1 ,t h e nI0 ∪ Im−N/2 = I0 ∪ I1 =[ 0 ,∞). Applying similar
27reasoning, one can verify that y =( 1 ,1,...,1N/2+1,−1,...,−1) ,( k =2 )
is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I0 and that y =( 1 ,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1) 
(k = 0) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I1.
If m = N/2, then y =( 1 ,1,...,1N/2,−1,...,−1)  is an equilibrium for
all −γ ∈ (0,∞), since y∗
[1] ≥ ...≥ y∗
[N/2] = z[N/2] + γ −1
N−1 >z [N/2] > 0a n d
y∗
[N] ≤ ...≤ y∗
[N/2+1] = z[N/2+1] + γ 1
N−1 <z [N/2+1] ≤ 0.
Due to symmetry, the above argument can be applied for m<N / 2w i t h
m replaced by ˜ m ≡ N − m ≥ N/2 and the roles of the outcomes +1 and -1
interchanged.
N odd The above argument can also be applied for odd N. Suppose that


























for r =1 ,2,...,m− (N +1 ) /2 − 1.
Taking the case that m>(N +1 ) /2 + 1, it follows that for −γ ∈
I0, y =( 1 ,1,...,1m,−1,...,−1)  (k =2 m − N) is an equilibrium; for
−γ ∈ Ir, r =1 ,2,...,m− (N +1 ) /2 − 1, y =( 1 ,1,...,1m−r,−1,...,−1) 
(k =2 ( m − r) − N) is an equilibrium; and for −γ ∈ Im−(N+1)/2, y =
(1,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1)  (k = 1) is an equilibrium.
If m =( N +1)/2+1,thenI0 ∪Im−(N+1)/2 = I0 ∪I1 =[ 0 ,∞). Applying
similar reasoning, one can verify that y =( 1 ,1,...,1(N+1)/2+1,−1,...,−1) 
(k = 3) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I0 and that y =( 1 ,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1) 
(k = 1) is an equilibrium when −γ ∈ I1.
If m =( N+1)/2, then y =( 1 ,1,...,1(N+1)/2,−1,...,−1)  is an equilib-
rium for all −γ ∈ (0,∞), since y∗
[1] ≥ ...≥ y∗
[(N+1)/2] = z[(N+1)/2] +γ ·0 > 0
and y∗
[N] ≤ ...≤ y∗
[(N+1)/2+1] = z[(N+1)/2+1] + γ 2
N−1 <z [N/2+1] ≤ 0. Again,
the case with m<(N +1 ) /2 follows from symmetry. 
28Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an agent i with yi = 1 and an agent j with yj = −1. Suppose
zj ≥ zi −
2γ
N−1.T h e ny∗











i . But since
yi =1a n dyj = −1 implies y∗
i > 0 ≥ y∗
j,w eh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that y with
 N
i=1 yi = k and ˜ y with
 N
i=1 ˜ yi = ˜ k and ˜ k  = k are
both equilibria of (3), given a combination {β,γ < 0,x, }. From lemma 3










,...,−1N) are both equilibria given
{β,γ < 0,x, }. Assume without loss of generality that ˜ k>k ,t h a ti s :
˜ k − k ≥ 2. Let ν b et h eﬁ r s ts u b j e c tw h o s ec h o i c ei s−1 in equilibrium yk
and +1 in equilibrium y




≤ 0a n dz[ν] + γ





˜ k − 1
N − 1
= z[ν] + γ
˜ k − k + k +1− 2
N − 1
= z[ν] + γ
k +1
N − 1       
≤0
+γ
(˜ k − k) − 2
N − 1       
≤0
≤ 0,
and the contradiction follows. 
Proof of Lemma 3
From the fact that y is an equilibrium with y[j] = −1a n dy[j+1] =1 ,i t
follows that
y∗









However, since γ<0, we have
˜ y∗
[j] = z[j] + γ
k − 1
N − 1





[j+1] = z[j+1] + γ
k +1
N − 1




29It then follows that ˜ y with ˜ y[i] = y[i] for i  = j,j +1a n d ˜ y[j] =1a n d
˜ y[j+1] = −1 is also an equilibrium. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Deﬁne ∀i, zG





N−1 +  i if i is a girl and zB










[i]) such that zG
[1] ≥ zG
[2] ≥ ...≥ z[NG] (zB
[1] ≥ zB
[2] ≥ ...≥ z[NB]), with NG
(NB) denoting the total number of girls (boys) in the sample.
The line of reasoning used in the proof of proposition 1 now can be
applied to the subset of girls (boys), with z[i] replaced by zG
[i] (zB
[i])a n dγ
replaced by γGG (γBB). 
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose the disturbances  i are i.i.d. according to a symmetric p.d.f. f(·),
such that f(−x)=f(x). Deﬁne mit ≡
 
j =iyjt/(N − 1) for all i =






F(β xi + γmit)
1+yit
2 F(−β xi − γmit)
1−yit
2 .

















F(β xj + γmjt)
1+yjt






∂[F(β xi + γmit)
1+yit




   
.
In this expression, ∂[F(β xi + γmit)
1+yit
2 F(−β xi − γmit)
1−yit




mitf(β xi + γmit)F(β xi + γmit)
yit−1





mitf(−β xi − γmit)F(−β xi − γmit)−
yit+1







F(β xi + γmit)
F(−β xi − γmit)
 yit
f(β xi + γmit)·
 
F(−β
 xi − γmit)/F(β
 xi + γmit) − 1
 




 xi − γmit)/F(β
 xi + γmit)+1
 
F(−β xi − γmit)/F(β xi + γmit)
  
= yitmitf(β xi + γmit).
The correctness of the last equation is easily veriﬁed by inserting yit =1























 xj + γmjt)
1+yjt
2 F(−β











For N =2 ,∂E[Q(β,γ,x,N)]/∂γ reduces to
[F(β x2 + γ) − F(β x2 − γ)]f(β x1 + γ)+
[F(−β x2 + γ) − F(−β x2 − γ)]f(β x1 − γ)+
[F(β x1 + γ) − F(β x1 − γ)]f(β x2 + γ)+
[F(−β x1 + γ) − F(−β x1 − γ)]f(β x2 − γ),
and for N =3t o
[F(β x2 + γ)F(β x3 + γ) − F(β x2)F(β x3)]f(β x1 + γ)+
[F(β x1 + γ)F(β x3 + γ) − F(β x1)F(β x3)]f(β x2 + γ)+
[F(β x1 + γ)F(β x2 + γ) − F(β x1)F(β x2)]f(β x3 + γ)+
[F(−β x2 + γ)F(−β x3 + γ) − F(−β x2)F(−β x3)]f(β x1 − γ)+
[F(−β x1 + γ)F(−β x3 + γ) − F(−β x1)F(−β x3)]f(β x2 − γ)+
[F(−β x1 + γ)F(−β x2 + γ) − F(−β x1)F(−β x2)]f(β x3 − γ).
One readily observes that for γ<0( γ>0) the terms within brackets are
all non-positive (non-negative). In the same way, one can show that this is
not true for values of N>3. This completes the proof. 
31References
Banerjee, A. V. (1992): “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, CVII(3), 797–817.
Becker, G. S., and K. M. Murphy (2001): Social Economics; Market Behavior
in a Social Environment.B e l k n a pP r i n t .
Bernheim, B. D. (1994): “A Theory of Conformity,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 102(5), 841–877.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1998): “Learning from
the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(3), 151–170.
Brock, W. A., and S. N. Durlauf (2001a): “Discrete Choice with Social In-
teractions,” Review of Economic Studies, 68(2).
(2001b): Interactions-Based Models, vol. 5 of Handbook of Econometrics.
North Holland, Amsterdam.
(2003): “Multinomial Choice with Social Interactions,” University of Wis-
consin, SSRI Working Paper no. 2003-1.
Cooper, R., and A. John (1988): “Coordinating Coordination Failures in Key-
nesian Models,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIII(3), 441–463.
G l a e s e r ,E .L . ,B .I .S a c e r dote, and J. A. Scheinkman (1996): “Crime and
Social Interactions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 507–548.
Glaeser, E. L., and J. A. Scheinkman (2003): “Nonmarket Interactions,”
in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth
World Congress,e d .b yM .D e w a t r i p o i n t ,L .P .H a n s e n ,a n dS .T u r n o v s k y ,v o l .I ,
pp. 339–369. Cambridge University Press.
Hoxby, C. (2000): “Peer Eﬀects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and
Race Variation,” NBER Working Paper #7867.
Ioannides, Y. M. (2003): “Topologies of Social Interactions,” mimeo (Tufts Uni-
versity).
Kooreman, P., and A. R. Soetevent (2002): “A Discrete Choice Model with
Social Interactions; an Analysis of High School Teen Behavior,” Working Paper
(University of Groningen).
(2003): “A Discrete Choice Model with Social Interactions; an Analysis
of High School Teen Behavior,” Working Paper (University of Groningen).
Krauth, B. (2001): “Social Interactions in Small Groups,” mimeo (Simon Fraser
University).
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1990): “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilib-
rium in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58(6), 1255–
1277.
Moffitt, R. A. (2001): “Policy Interventions, Low-Level Equilibria, and Social
Interactions,” in Social Dynamics, ed. by S. N. Durlauf, and H. P. Young, pp.
45–82. MIT Press.
32Pesendorfer, W. (1995): “Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles,” American
Economic Review, 85(4), 771–791.
Tamer, E. (2002): “Empirical Strategies for Estimating Discrete Games with
Multiple Equilibria,” Department of Economics, Princeton University.
(2003): “Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple
Equilibria,” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 147–65.
Topkis, D. M. (1998): Supermodularity and Complementarity, Frontiers of Eco-
nomic Research. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Vives, X. (1990): “Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 19, 305–321.
(1999): Oligopoly Pricing; Old Ideas and New Tools. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
33